As breakthroughs in biology accelerate, the line between innovation and misuse can grow dangerously thin. We are currently in an era where sequencing a genome can be completed in under a day for as little as $600. This opens up the field to new companies, individuals and lack of oversight. In fact, DNA synthesis companies currently operate under limited government regulation when it comes to the distribution of genetic material. Inadequate buyer screening processes leaves the companies’ materials vulnerable to misuse and buyers could exploit specific sequences or synthesis steps to create harmful biological materials, posing risks to public health and national security.
Enter Team Omnyra, one of Stanford University’s spring 2025 Hacking for Defense (H4D) teams tackling the intersection of biotechnology and biosecurity. Partnering with the U.S. government, Omnyra is focused on a critical and timely mission: modernizing the screening of synthetic DNA orders to prevent the creation of harmful biological materials.
Their goal is to design smarter systems to detect and deter the misuse of genetic sequences — and in doing so, protect public health, national security and global biological resilience.
The Challenge: Closing the Gaps in DNA Synthesis Screening
As synthetic biology tools become less expensive and more widely available, malicious actors no longer need state-of-the-art labs to cause harm. DNA synthesis companies, tasked with printing custom genetic code on demand, are one of the last controllable gateways in this growing ecosystem.
Yet current approaches to screening DNA orders for potential threats are outdated, fragmented, and voluntary.
Team Omnyra’s research has uncovered key gaps:
Combinatorial gaps: Current approaches fail to robustly predict and detect dangerous combinatorial patterns or fragments of sequences that could be assembled into harmful constructs.
Database Limitations: Screening methods rely on outdated comparison techniques (ex. BLAST) and incomplete databases of known toxins and pathogens. Emerging threats and evolving regulations are not incorporated quickly enough.
Limited Government Regulation: Participation in international gene synthesis consortiums, which has been the main industry push to standardize biosecurity, is voluntary, weakening the ability to enforce universal standards.
Buyer Verification and Tracking: There is a lack of stringent measures to verify the intent and identity of buyers, as well as insufficient mechanisms for tracking the end use of synthesized DNA.

Team Omnyra is working to develop a multi-layered, modernized solution that combines machine learning, seamless reporting pipelines and user-centered design to better secure the DNA synthesis supply chain.
Meet Team Omnyra
What’s at Stake
With the barriers to building biological threats dropping daily, Team Omnyra’s work is more than academic – it is urgent. Their interviews with biosecurity leaders, government officials, synthesis providers, and biotech experts have revealed a shared consensus: current safeguards are no match for the speed of innovation.
A better system would:
Flag high-risk sequences, even when disguised or fragmented.
Vet buyers and track sequence usage.
Update databases in real time to reflect new threats.
Balance innovation and security without stifling scientific progress.
If successful, Team Omnyra’s solution could inform regulatory frameworks, improve industry standards, and help ensure that synthetic biology fulfills its promise — without becoming a vector for harm.
See the Teams in Action
All eight (8) H4D teams will present their findings at Stanford University on Tuesday, June 3, at 5:15 pm PT. Join in person or online via livestream. RSVP HERE to secure your spot and learn more about their innovative work.
Check out some of the other Spring 2025 H4D Team blogs to date:
Team Hydra Strike
Team OmniComm
Team ArgusNet
The Hacking for Defense (H4D) program has been taught at 70 colleges and universities around the world and has created 72 startups that have generated 660 jobs and raised more than $350 million. To learn more about the H4D course at Stanford University visit h4d.stanford.edu; to learn more about H4D around the world visit h4d.us. To learn more about The Hacking for Defense® Manual by Jeff Decker, PhD, visit Amazon.